redistributed from areas of overprovision to areas of need.
The team needs to be visible and proactive. Being on the spot both ensures that colleagues know who to call on and also allows you to assess needs directly and act on your own judgement. It also has the immeasurable benefit of raising the team's face validity with your colleagues so that important, potentially threatening activities such as psychological debriefing are more readily accepted. Staff debriefing needs to be clearly understood as an integral part of the incident procedure for all staff and distinguished clearly from counselling or psychotherapy. There is time for staff to make some preparation for these groups, and we have found Raphael's book When Disaster Strikes helpful in this area5. Attending to the team's own needs can easily be forgotten. The work is exciting, but exhausting. It can be difficult to switch off. The difficulty of assessing your performance can make it a very stressful time. The team needs to monitor its members to ensure that they are taking adequate time off and not losing a sense of perspective. We have some simple rules, such as insisting on taking a lunch break, reading the paper daily and going home at a reasonable hour. These, allied with attending the daily steering/core group meeting, should ensure that staff are protected. There may also be a role for establishing a support group to explore and discharge tensions within the team.
Staff also need training. It is essential that all staff who may become involved in the major incident procedure familiarize themselves with the plan and the relevant locales. We have decided that the psychiatric response should be reviewed and rehearsed each year. Theoretical issues in responses to disaster Introduction There are now numerous descriptions of human behaviour before, during, and after disasters, and in particular of the problems subsequently reported by disaster survivors'-4. Summaries of these reported problems have been collected in an attempt to delineate diagnostic categories, of which the most used are DSM-IIIR and ICD-10. The question which must be answered is whether it is possible to go beyond a detailed description of post-disaster reactions, and to provide an explanatory framework and the beginnings of a model of human reactions to adversity. From a research point of view, disasters can be considered as natural experiments, in which unselected groups of people are subjected to events which are outside the range of ordinary human experience. As such they have implications for the understanding of the causes and development of stress related disorders. They may help us to understand more about the nature of anxiety and depression, and why it is that so many people are able to cope with adversity without major psychological ill affects. However, these objectives can only be achieved if observations are linked to explanations, and these explanations are then tested against new data.
The explanations which tend to be given about stress reactions are often simple and non-theoretical. Arguments are drawn by analogy from the engineering of solid structures, where stress is the force per unit area exerted between contiguous bodies in parts of a body. This is commonly depicted as a large weight resting on a fragile and unstable structure. As a term, stress is often used in situations in which strain would be more appropriate. 'Strain' describes the case where objects are stretched tightly and made taut and exercised to their greatest possible extent.
Compressive stress is what a large weight applies to anything beneath it. Strain is the extent to which the supporting structure is deformed and compressed by the weight above. By plotting stress against strain it is possible to derive what is called the 'elastic modulus' for any material, and this measure allows architects and engineers to choose appropriate materials to bear particular loads. Common to all these views of psychological stress is the notion that when a soft human body comes into contact with hard objects, damage is likely to result. By analogy, events are seen as hard objects which weight a person down, and which require an elastic and stable structure to withstand.
The term 'stress' is used so loosely that distinctions are often not drawn between cause and effect. This has led to considerable confusion both in public perceptions and in the stress literature. Properly speaking, stress is not an object in the world. It is the reaction of an organism to events in the world. In order to make this distinction clear it is usual to distinguish between stressors, which are objects and events in the world, and stress reactions, which are a variety of physiological and psychological responses when confronted with a stressor. Typically, stressors are defined as things which can cause harm to an organism, though the notion of harm has been cast widely to include psychological concepts such as wellbeing and self-esteem. In the case of major threats to life, stressors can be determined objectively. In the case of minor stressors, there is an element of circularity, because, for example, a particular cutting remark could only be defined as a stressor by asking the recipient if they had been distressed by it.
Early research on stress
Early researchers such as Cannon5 and Selye6 (1950) were primarily concerned with the ways in which organisms withstood prolonged and severe environmental stresses. Selye in particular depicted stress as a defence against an adaptation to external environmental challenge. He described a general adaptation syndrome in which the organism first alerted itself to the challenge, secondly summoned its resistance and finally, if the challenge continued, went into a state of exhaustion. Selye's work has been criticized as simplistic, because it has taken a general view of stress reactions, limited itself to physical stressors and underplayed psychological considerations, particularly the role of intervening psychological states.
More recent work has tried to classify stressors in more detail. In particular, distinctions must be drawn between acute and chronic stress and attention must be paid to how much warning is given and what coping responses are available to the organism. Spielberger7 has argued that whereas all people respond similarly to physical threats, responses to ego threats are determined by personality. Habitually anxious people show very strong reactions to threats to self-esteem and well-being at a psychological level.
Lazarus and Folkman8 have proposed that stress should be seen as 'a particular relationship between the person and the environment that is appraised by the person as taxing or exceeding his or her resources and endangering his or her well-being' (p 19). This model moves away from the passive model ofphysical objects to one in which an active organism has a real or perceived capacity to meet the real or perceived demands of the world. Lazarus has stressed that it is the perception of demand and capacity which determines stress levels. This view underplays the possibility that real demands and real capacity are the determining factors in most cases.
Hobfoll9'10 has argued that this model has serious shortcomings in its present form. First, it does not separately define demand and coping capacity, which are the two sides ofthe model. Unless this can be done arguments about balance will always be circular. Additionally, measures of demand and coping capacity are often made after the challenging event. A far more powerful test is to determine these in advance and then observe the outcome. The purely perceptual nature of the model as specified by Lazarus means that if a person is successfully coping with a heavy demand this will not be perceived as stressful, and this success at adapting will fall outside of the field of study simply because the succesfl individual does not perceive himself or herself as being under stress.
More generally, even ifdemand and coping capacity can be identified, I would argue that there is a great problem in deciding what meaningful units they should be measured in. In engineering, of course, this is less of a problem. Engines can be rated for their horse power and their efficiency and there are clear formulas which allow the engineer to translate that power into useful work. It is precisely this ability to measure in meaningful units which allows an engineer to decide whether a particular engine will be capable of carrying out a particular job. Psychology
is not yet able to provide these meaningful units. There is no central paradigm strong enough to allow us to assemble our many observations into coherent calculations about capacity. Until such a time, we have to produce rankings rather than absolute measures of demand and capacity.
A proposed strategy for the measurement of maJor stressors One shortcoming oftheories of stress is that they draw no distinction between different types of stress reaction. Stress is very broadly defined as a reaction to anticipated loss, or actual loss, or lack of gain. The implication is that reactions to these three events will be so similar that they may be subsumed under the same model.
On the contrary, I would argue that the impact of a stressful event can best be understood if it is assessed on the two dimensions of threat and loss. Some survivors experience the terror of feeling that they are about to die, but come through the experience without bodily injury or the loss of loved ones. For example, someone who experiences a mock execution will have experienced extremely high threat, but will not have experienced any major loss. On the other hand, the relatives of a person executed in a foreign land will have all the pain of their bereavement, but will not themselves have experienced personal threat. Will the mock execution survivor and the bereaved relative show the same stress response, or will the response be specific to the stressor that caused it? A first step in attempting to answer this question is to see whether threat and loss can be assessed, even if only on relative scales.
Assessment of threat
There are many ways of assessing threat. The personal way, though also the most circular, is to ask people what they find the most threatening. The scores given to threatening events can be taken as a measure ofthe threat perceived by that person. The difficulty with this approach is that although it may be personal it is very difficult to compare threats across different people. Therefore, attempts have been made to average the threat scores given by different people and thus provide a list of average threats, as perceived by people in general. Such lists are still based on subjective perceptions, but represent the views of the wider community.
Rachman"1 has outlined the characteristics of threatening stimuli which seem to give rise to most adjustment problems, or in his terms, give rise to the greatest difficulty in emotional processing. Stimuli which are sudden, intense, and dangerous are naturally more troublesome than those that are signalled, mild and safe. Stimuli which are unpredictable, uncontrollable, which happen irregularly and in large chunks are harder to process than those which are predictable, controllable, regular and which happen in small chunks. There is also an additional problem when the stimuli relate to instinctive 'prepared' fears. In summary, the very worst stress would appear to be something that happens suddenly, without warning, is intense and dangerous, taps into a prepared and instinctive fear, appears to be uncontrollable and unpredictable, happens on an irregular basis and comes in very large chunks. These are the primary features of most disasters.
The other approach is to get an estimate of hazard without asking about individual perceptions. These estimates may be based on death rates, or possibly time off work because of sickness or injury. This actuarial approach is far more objective, but is easier to apply to major hazards rather than moderate stressors which may cause distress but not threat to life.
Whatever the technique used, there is general agreement that some events are likely to be ranked higher than others, and that the severe and sustained life threat experienced by the extermination camp survivor would be rated more highly than a frightening event of short duration.
Assessment of loss
Again, as with threat, the measurement of loss, anticipated or actual, can be approached from the personal subjective point of view, and the objective statistical point of view. From a subjective point of view, the loss of even a small memento may have considerable emotional impact. Seen purely from an objective standpoint, such a loss would not be considered life-threatening and would be given a low loss value. The personal approach concentrates on the meaning of the particular loss for the individual. Loss of status, loss of memorabilia and loss of love can all be given a personal score by the individual concerned. The statistical approach seems cruder, harsher, but more systematic. It looks at human loss the way an insurance company would do, and tries to apportion amounts according to previously established rules about what various losses are worth. This seems a horrible approach to human suffering, because it is evident that it is appearing to attempt to repair the loss but doing so in the wrong currency. This sort of approach accords a value to the loss of a limb, to the loss of an eye, to a loss of a life and makes judgements about all material losses as if they could be determined either by replacement value, that is to say the cost of buying something to replace it, or market value, that is to say the value you would get if you had sold the object in question.
Such a measure of loss would put personal injury, bereavement, the loss of housing and the loss of all material objects on the same scale. In actual practice this scale would be a conceptual model only. Face to face with an individual survivor you would be working with their own perceptions and their own meanings. However, when trying to explain the factors which accounted for the particular reactions of a large number of survivors, it is necessary to consider what can be called the monetary version of loss as a potential explanation for the severity of reactions. It is unlikely to tell the whole story because it leaves out personal meaning, but since these scales have been established over many years by people who have had to deal with a large number of victims, they may have more explanatory power than is generally realized.
Response specificity
Another useful simplification is the view that threat phenomena cause reactions of anxiety, and loss phenomena cause reactions of depression. Threats imply that the person should remain tense because the world has been shown to be more dangerous than they had previously realized. There is evidence that anxious subjects are sensitized in their perception of threat stimuli, and may have a bias in processing information related to personal threat12.
Losses cause depression because they deny survivors things to which they had already formed attachments. Since development involves making affectional bonds, people come to accept this as the usual levels of reward they get in their every day life. When these bonds are broken, the level of daily reward goes down, and depression is the result. This view suggests that, within certain ranges, we habituate to the level of reward we experience and come to expect it as the norm.
One consequence of this approach is that it becomes very important whether the survivor views a particular object or person as being replaceable. One would expect that the more unique and intense the relationship the smaller the chance of a replacement being found. It would also suggest that people have some internal understanding of life expectation and will be less affected by the loss of a person who is elderly, and who had fewer years to live. On a simple reward model, it could be calculated that the future reward from the elderly person was limited, and so that the real loss if that person dies is low. There would be the sadness of loss of attachment, but it would be manageable. Again, following this harsh view ofpersonal relations, the cost of an elderly person may be high in the sense of them having high dependency needs, so that on balance, in terms of social relationships, someone who is having to care for an elderly person may eventually be rewarded by their death. If the dead person passes on their goods to the survivors then again the balance of reward will be in favour of the person's death.
The reward model may explain why the death of an elderly relative or parent should not be too difficult to cope with. Following this model, it could also be argued that the greatest loss would be of the person from whom most was expected, and that is one's child. One would expect to have their affection and attention all the days of one's life. Their death would be considered the greatest loss of reward.
Our knowledge of stress is rich in descriptive detail, but weak in objective measurement and conceptual development. The study of disasters, if linked to a more closely specified resources model, and carefully measured assessment of threat and loss, may yet give us the better understanding which will create more accurate measures of human resilience, and better techniques to help those who find that the demands of a trauma exceed their own capacity to cope. Coping with a disaster is probably the most daunting task with which members of the caring professions can be faced. Experience in Aberfan and several other communities affected by disasters has made it clear to the writer that there is no single plan which will be appropriate for all such situations; to some extent we shall always be unprepared. Having said that there is now an extensive literature on the psychological aspects of disasters and this, plus the accumulated clinical experience of recent years together with studies of lesser bereavements and other traumatic stresses make it possible to offer some guidelines for intervention which should go some way to reduce the psychological damage which often follows. The scientific justification for intervention stems from three types of research finding: (1) Evidence that disasters constitute a risk to mental health has been reviewed by Raphael1 and by Lystad2. This research discloses an increased risk of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among survivors, an increased risk of pathological grief among those bereaved by disasters and an increased risk of depression and other psychiatric illness among affected persons who are already vulnerable.
(2) Evidence that people at special risk can be identified soon after a disaster strikes is most adequate for bereaved people3'4, but current work promises to extend it to survivors and other affected persons. (3) Persuasive evidence from random allocation studies that counselling offered to people at risk will reduce that risk comes from studies of high risk bereaved people5'6 and there is good clinical evidence to support the beneficial effects of early intervention on PTSD. Despite this evidence there are few hospital disaster plans which take any account of the psychosocial needs of people affected by disaster. Most of these are exclusively concerned with saving life and limb, even though in some disasters, there are no survivors.
Not that the help that has been given is negligible. Ifyou compare Aberfan, where a well-run community support and development programme was eventually implemented, with Buffalo Creek, a similar mining valley in the Appalachians, where the bursting of a dam inundated several villages and took 125 lives, it is clear that the citizens of Buffalo Creek, who received little or no psychosocial support, suffered more lasting psychological damage than those of Aberfan7.
The two most important variables to be considered in planning a response to disasters are the scale (or magnitude) of the disaster and the spread (or size of the geographical area from which those affected by the disaster come). Table 1 divides disasters into nine types according to the scale of the disaster (large, medium, or small) and the spread (local, national, or international). (For planning purposes a small disaster can be said to cause less than 100 deaths, medium 100-1000, and large > 1000 deaths, and/or equivalent destruction of property.) It gives an example of each category and enables us to consider the practical implications for the organization of a response in each case. (Further details are given in a fuller version ofthis paper which can be obtained from the author.)
In general small scale disasters can be contained by existing caring agencies and large scale disasters are so overwhelming in their effects that considerable aid is needed from outside the disaster area. Provision of essentials for survival take precedence over psychosocial care. It is no surprise to find that much of the published literature on psychosocial aspects focuses on medium scale disasters. 0141-0768/91/ 010022-04/$02.00/0
